March 06, 2025 | Incident and Crime Statistics , Firearm Offences
Request Number: [FOI/13355]
Category: Incident and Crime Statistics - Firearm Offences
Subject: 3D Printed Guns
Request and Answer:
In relation to request number FOI/13355 Police Service of Northern Ireland is providing an NCND response and will explain this further in the response below.
Request
I would like to know how many 3D-printed guns have been recovered by the force in each year (separately) between 2020 and 2024.
Answer
In accordance with the Act, this letter represents a Refusal Notice for this particular request. The Police Service of Northern Ireland can neither confirm nor deny that it holds the information you have requested.
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in the request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.
Where exemptions are relied upon Section 17(1) of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which;
a) states that fact,
b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and
c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.
The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) can Neither Confirm Nor Deny that it holds the information relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) – Information Supplied By Or Concerning Certain Security Bodies: The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3)
Section 24(2) – National Security: The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, exemption from section 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement: The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section1(1)(a) would, or would be likely to, prejudice any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1).
The full text of exemptions can be found at www.legislation.gov.uk and further guidance on how they operate can be located on the Information Commissioners Office website www.ico.org.uk.
Section 23 is an absolute class-based exemption and there is no requirement to conduct a harm or public interest test.
Sections 24 and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or denying that any other information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.
‘Neither Confirm nor Deny’ (NCND)
There may be occasions when complying with the duty to confirm or deny under section 1(1)(a) would in itself disclose sensitive or potentially damaging information that falls under an exemption. In these circumstances, the Act allows a public authority to respond by refusing to confirm or deny whether it holds the requested information.
The decision to issue a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ response is not affected by whether we do or do not hold the information but relates to the consequences of confirming or denying the information is held. The starting point and main focus in most cases will be theoretical considerations about the consequences of confirming or denying that a particular type of information is held. The decision to neither confirm nor deny is separate from a decision not to disclose information and needs to be taken entirely on its own merits.
PSNI follow the Information Commissioner’s Guidance in relation to ‘NCND’ and you may find it helpful to refer to this at the following link:
Section 1(1)(a) of the Act requires a public authority to confirm whether it holds the information that has been requested. Section 23(5) provides an exemption from this duty. Section 23(5) of the FOIA states that “the duty confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section 1(1) (a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or indirectly supplied by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).”
The police service in its fight against crime and terrorism may engage at times with the bodies listed at Section 23 of the FOIA and on occasion there may be information provided to police from one of these bodies. As advised above the decision to issue an NCND response is not affected by whether we do or do not hold the information but relates to the consequences of confirming or denying the information is held. To confirm or deny whether intelligence was used in specific investigations would undermine police services’ ability to use intelligence information as an operational tool for investigating crimes including those that may have occurred historically. The NCND response is used to avoid risks caused by providing inconsistent responses to a series of similar requests where the information may originate from a number of sources and not necessarily a security body.
Evidence of Harm:
Confirmation or denial that information is held would identify local level activity regarding the use and/or seizure of 3D printed weapons. In turn this risks identifying the level of police awareness of such weapons in the force area. When the request is made to multiple forces, there is a further risk in that confirmation or denial would reveal information which could be used to build a picture as to where national and local investigations and operations are taking place, and perhaps more pertinently where they are not, to combat the supply, distribution and use of these weapons. This mapping effect, created by forces either confirming information is held and citing a substantive exemption or, conversely, stating ‘no information held’, would undermine the effective delivery of operational law enforcement by revealing the intelligence picture of the force in respect of 3D printed firearms as well as compromising potentially ongoing investigations, some of which may be covert.
Disclosure of information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) is considered a release to the world at large and not a private transaction. Whilst not questioning an applicant’s motives in this case, by making a public disclosure under FOI, it must be considered that as well as members of the public, criminals, including terrorists will be able to access the data released. It is widely known that organised criminal gangs and those involved in terrorist related activity monitor FOI disclosures closely for any information they can use to further their criminal activity.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, based upon current intelligence that threat level to the UK currently is 'substantial, meaning an attack is likely.
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity that could be used to the advantage of criminal organisations, serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to undermine the operational integrity of policing will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on, not only law enforcement at a local level, but policing and operations at a national level the impact of which risks the national security of the UK.
Public Interest Considerations
Section 24(2) National Security
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)
Any information that would increase public knowledge in showing how resources are allocated in response to events would favour disclosure. This would also support the fundamental purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, which is to be more open and transparent in the way in which the police perform, making them more accountable for their actions. Releasing any details regarding the seizure of 3D printed firearms would provide reassurance to the public that the police are appropriately resourced in this area and would be in a position to respond to any National Security threats or incidents. Any information which would allow for more accurate public debate would be a positive factor for disclosure.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)
Whilst there is a public interest in providing reassurance that the police are appropriately and effectively dealing with threats posed by terrorist organisations, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding national security and the welfare and safety of the general public. Any disclosure (including confirming or denying information is held) has the potential to undermine ongoing and future operations to protect the Security of the United Kingdom, e.g. counter terrorism activity. The risk of significant harm or even death to the community at large would be increased.
The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would build a picture of potential vulnerabilities at a local level. The more information disclosed over time will provide a more detailed account of the investigative focus of not only a force area but also the country as a whole. Any incident which results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)
There is a media reporting concerning the increase of these weapons, 3D guns appearing on British Streets which in itself is a factor supporting confirmation or denial.
To confirm or deny that this information is held would make members of the public more aware of the threat of certain offences and the forces ability to deal with them. Improved public awareness may lead to more intelligence being submitted to police about possible further instances of 3D- printed firearms use and any acts of criminality or perceived terrorism as members of the public will be more observant to suspicious activity which in turn may result in a reduction of crime.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)
To confirm or deny that the requested information is held could compromise law enforcement tactics which would hinder the Police force's ability to prevent and detect crimes. Whilst such information on its own may be perceived as not harmful, any further information that may be already in the public domain or any that may be asked for in the future could be detrimental to forces and can contribute to the mosaic effect. The ‘mosaic’ effect is attune to the building up of a jigsaw, from public disclosures and other information, gradually filling in the pieces to form a complete picture. For criminals, including serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to gain easy access to such information would not only undermine the police’s primary function of law enforcement but also place the public at significant risk of harm.
Decision
To confirm or deny that any such information is held or not held would indicate levels of policing activity at force level which could allow individuals to evaluate levels of activity across individual force areas and exploit what may be considered as less active or resourced areas. If this information is disclosed it continually drip feeds in the pool of information publically available to criminals and terrorists who will use it to complete a full picture on how and where to undertake their criminal pursuits without fear of detection or apprehension.
The security of the country is of paramount importance. The police will not divulge any information that would place the safety of officers or the public at risk or undermine national security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat of activity involving weapons, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations. It is not in the best interests of the security of the country, individual forces or the public in general to put such information into the public arena where it could be used by those wishing to cause harm. It is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying that this information is held, not made out.
No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.