Guidance and Training - Policing of Protests

Request Number: FOI/15855

Category: Organisational Information & Performance - Policies

Subject: Guidance and Training - Policing of Protests

Request and Answer: 
Your request for information has now been considered. In respect of Section 1(1)(a) of the Act we can confirm that the Police Service of Northern Ireland does hold information to which your request relates and this is being provided to you.

However, we consider some of the information you seek in this request exempt by virtue of Section 23, 24, 31 and 40 of FOIA and have detailed our rationale as to why these exemptions apply. We have also provided you with links to guidance issued by the Information Commissioner’s Office which we have followed in responding to your request.

Request
I would like to request all documents and information related to any guidance, training and relevant supporting documents provided to or created by your police force following 5 July 2025, as well as all internal guidance or training delivered by your force as it relates to:
- the policing of the protests in support of Palestine Action or against the proscription of this body, and;
- Online or offline support of the body.

Answer
Please see the PDF attached, titled ‘15855 – Accompanying Documents - Redacted’, containing information we have determined can be released into the public domain, in relation to the information sought in this request. Some information has been redacted from this document and the reasons for these exemptions are explained below. Additionally, we have chosen to exempt the release of any other records held and the rationale for this is also detailed below.

Section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 requires the Police Service of Northern Ireland, when refusing to provide such information (because the information is exempt) to provide you the applicant with a notice which:

1. states that fact,
2. specifies the exemption in question and
3. states (if not otherwise apparent) why the exemption applies.

The exemptions, as well as the factors the Department considered when deciding where the public interest lies, are listed below:

Section 23 (1) Information Supplied By Or Concerning Certain Security Bodies – provides an exemption for information if it was directly or indirectly supplied to a public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3)

Section 24 (1) National Security – Information required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Section 31(1) (a) (b) - Law Enforcement – Information would be likely to prejudice (a) the prevention or detection of crime (b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

Section 40(2)(a)(b) by virtue of Section 40(3)(A)(a) – Personal Information - Information constitutes personal data and disclosure would contravene any of the Data Protection principles.

The full text of exemptions can be found at www.legislation.gov.uk and further guidance on how they operate can be located on the Information Commissioners Office website www.ico.org.uk.

Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case.

Section 24 and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions which means there is a requirement to evidence the prejudice (harm) in disclosure and consider the public interest.

Section 40 is an absolute class based exemption and no public interest test is required.

Exemptions Explained

Section 23
Information in relation to your request is being withheld under Section 23 FOIA. This is applied due to the fact that the information requested relates to a security body listed within Section 23(3) of the FOIA, therefore there is an automatic exemption placed on this information. This exemption is an absolute, class based exemption and there is no requirement for the PSNI to consider the Public Interest Test or provide any evidence of Harm.

Section 40
Section 40 (2) of the FOIA is an absolute exemption which means there is no requirement on PSNI to consider whether there is a public interest in disclosure. It is an interface exemption and we must consider whether release of the information would breach the General Data Protection Regulations (‘GDPR’) or the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘DPA’) Third party personal information constitutes ‘personal data’ under the GDPR (Article 4) and DPA (Part 1 s.3).

Under the Freedom of Information Act, PSNI must consider if information can be released into the public domain. I have therefore considered whether the disclosure of this personal data is subject to the exemption at Section 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 by virtue of s40 (3)(A)(a). As this information is ‘personal data’, PSNI considered whether disclosure would contravene any of the six data protection principles contained within the GDPR or DPA.

The six data protection principles are good information handling standards which PSNI must comply with in relation to how it handles personal information, including deciding whether to disclose it or not.  In particular, the first principle requires personal data to be processed in a lawful and fair manner. In considering whether it is ‘fair’ to any individual to release information about them, PSNI considered the likely expectations of those individuals and the nature of the information involved. Individuals must have confidence that their information is treated sensitively and appropriately by PSNI. We consider those individuals would not have any reasonable expectation PSNI would disclose such information of this nature about them. We consider it would be extremely unfair to those individuals and therefore a breach of the first principle of data protection legislation. This information is therefore exempt under section 40 (2) of the FOIA as it contravenes data protection legislation to release it and PSNI has made the decision to withhold that information.

Section 24 Harm
The release of information under Freedom of Information (FOI) is a release into the public domain and not just to the individual requesting the information. Once information is disclosed by FOI there is no control or limits as to who or how the information is shared with other individuals, therefore a release under FOI is considered a disclosure to the world in general.

Disclosure of information from multiple forces would result in patterns of police activity, tactical capabilities and operational planning in respect of terrorist proscription and operational planning in relation to the policing of proscribed groups, being identified. Identification via this mapping effect of what may appear less resourced or actively policed areas risks those areas becoming targets for individuals with criminal intent, to exploit. This undermines policing, increasing the risk of crime and threatens public safety. Given the information in question is directly relevant to counter terrorism strategy and policing of proscribed terrorist groups, this in turn impacts upon the overall security of the UK.

Section 24 Public Interest Test
Factors Favouring Release
The pubic are entitled to know public money is spent in areas of operational policing. Release of the information would facilitate transparency. It would also encourage public debate about how the police prevent and detect crime and uphold the law in terms of proscription of terrorist groups in order to protect the security interests of the UK.

Factors Against Release
To disclose information would render security measures less effective by revealing a national picture of operational counter terrorism strategy. Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information that may aid a criminal, terrorist or proscribed organisation should be disclosed. To what extend this information may aid terrorism in the UK is not precisely known, but it is clear that a disclosure of information will have an impact on the force’s ability to monitor and police proscribed terrorist groups and terrorists effectively; compromising the security of the UK.

Section 24 Balancing Test/Decision
The security of the country is paramount, and the police service will not divulge any information if to do so would place the safety of an individual, the public at large or the national security of the UK at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in transparency of policing and promotion of public debate to improve response, there is a far stronger public interest in safeguarding national security, the integrity of operational policing and keeping the public safe. For these reasons we believe that the balancing test for disclosing the information is not made out in this case.

Section 31 Harm
Disclosure of the information would reveal specific strategies, rationale, intelligence and tactics in relation to the identification and policing of proscribed terrorist groups. This could be used by criminals, those with criminal intent, members of proscribed organisations, and terrorists to undermine and obstruct operational policing, as well as amend their current practices to evade detection. This would consequently be detrimental to the police’s ability to ensure the law is enforced, offenders apprehended, public safety is maintained and threats to the security of the UK are identified and prevented.

Additionally, disclosure of information captured by this request would undermine the effectiveness of current and future police operations and proceedings. It would reveal details of police intelligence and strategy used to counter criminal activity and apprehend offenders.

Section 31 Public Interest test
Factors Favouring Release
Disclosure of information would provide the pubic with better understanding of operational policing, increase public debate and provide information which may allow the public to take steps to better protect themselves. This awareness may also lead to more information being passed to police by the public as they become more alert to suspicious activity.

Factors Against Release
By disclosing the information, law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime specific to terrorism. More crime would be committed because members of proscribed terrorist organisations, would have knowledge of operational capability, tactics, strategy and intelligence which would allow then to operate more effectively as well as avoid detection. This may put the public at an increased risk of harm and any information which undermines operational law enforcement or places the public at risk is not in the public interest to disclose.

Section 31 Balancing Test/Decision
While it is important to provide the public with an insight into operational policing, the effective delivery of operational law enforcement takes priority and is at the forefront of PSNI to ensure the prevention and detection of crime is carried out and the effective apprehension or prosecution of offenders is maintained, whilst safeguarding the public. Releasing all of the requested information would compromise the PSNI’s ability to carry out these functions and would be to the detriment of public safety.

The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain. Once information is disclosed by FOI there is no control or limits as to who or how the information is shared with other individuals, therefore a release under FOI is considered a release to the world in general, not just to the individual requesting the information.

It is our opinion that the balancing test demonstrates disclosing the requested information would not be in the public interest.