February 13, 2026 | Operational Policing, Investigations and Events
Request Number: FOI/16824
Category: Operational policing, Investigations and Events
Subject: Investigations and Operations Informant Spending in the Last 2 Years (CHIS)
Request
Request the following information relating to your forces spending on informants:
Request 1
The total amount of money your force has spent on informants or Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) in each of the past two years (please use the two last full reporting years, whether this is calendar, financial or another period).
Answer 1
The table below outlines the PSNl's payment to Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) for financial years 2024/25 and 2023/24.
Financial Year Amount(£)
2023/2024 385 395
2024/2025 382,459
Please see below for further on the information provided.
Partial NCND
PSNI can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) - Information Supplied By Or Concerning Certain Security Bodies: The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).
Section 24(2) National Security - The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, exemption from section 1(1) (a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
Section 30(3) - Investigations – the duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt information by virtue of subsection (1) or (2).
Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest. Confirming or denying the existence of whether any information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.
Section 24 is a qualified exemption and as such there is a requirement to evidence any harm in confirmation or denial that any other information is held, as well as consider the public interest.
Section 30 is a class based and qualified exemption and there is a requirement to consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming nor denying any other information is held, is appropriate.
Public Interest Test
Section 24(2) National Security
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirmation or denying that any other information is held
The public are entitled to know how funds are spent and resources distributed within an area of policing. To confirm whether any further information exists would enable the general public to see where funds are allocated in order to prevent crime. It would demonstrate that payments made to CHIS are done in line with Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and local force policies and procedures.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that information is held
Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent confirmation or denial may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity.
The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection. The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain and in some circumstances such as these, confirmation or denial that information is held.
The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would build a picture of vulnerabilities within certain scenarios. The more information disclosed over time will provide a more detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of not only a force area but also the country as a whole. Any incident which results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.
Section 30(3) Investigations
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that information is held
Confirming or denying that any further information exists would lead to a better informed public, improving their knowledge and understanding of how the Police Service utilise Covert Human Intelligence Sources as part of their investigative policing.
The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. Confirming that further information exists could promote public trust in providing transparency and demonstrating openness and accountability into how the investigation took place. It could also provide reassurance to the public that the Police Service takes all reports of a crime seriously and conducts investigations appropriately. To confirm if further information is held could allow the public to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the Police Service.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that information is held
However, by its very nature information held relating to informants is sensitive in nature. Under Freedom of Information (FOI) there is a requirement to comply with Section 1(1) (a) and confirm what information is held. In some cases it is that confirmation, or not, which could disclose facts harmful to informants. In some cases their mere existence can place individuals in grave danger. The only methodology which will provide the required degree of protection to those individuals is if the force takes advantage of its ability under FOI legislation to, when appropriate, not confirm or deny that the information requested is, or is not held. The Police Service will never confirm or deny information is held if in doing so could identify investigative activity and therefore undermine their investigations. To do so would hinder the prevention or detection of crime.
Decision
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations, information gathering and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively safeguarding CHIS who are crucial in the detection and prevention of crime and the conviction of terrorists and criminals. Furthermore, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly sensitive area of terrorism.
The PSNI will not divulge information, should it be held, if it is likely that it will compromise the work of the Police Service or place informants at risk, which in turn would increase risk to the public. It is known that terrorist cells and criminal organisations will try to identify CHIS in order to eradicate them. Disclosure of the requested information, if held, would place those in vulnerable situations at higher risk of harm and adversely affect policing in Northern Ireland.
Request 2
The amount of money that was spent on informants in protest or activist groups
Request 3
The amount of this that was spent on informants in a) far right groups b) pro-Palestine groups and c) environmental groups
Answers 2-3
Whilst we have provided the table above for total payment to CHIS for the last 2 financial years, PSNI is withholding the above requested breakdowns, the rationale for which is explained below.
Exemptions
Section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 requires the Police Service of Northern Ireland, when refusing to provide such information (because the information is exempt) to provide you the applicant with a notice which:
- states that fact,
- specifies the exemption in question and
- states (if not otherwise apparent) why the exemption applies.
The exemptions, as well as the factors the Department considered when deciding where the public interest lies, are listed below:
Section 30(2)(b) – It relates to the obtaining of information from confidential sources.
Section 38(1) Health and Safety - Information is exempt information if its disclosure under the FOIA would, or would be likely to (a) endanger the physical or mental health of any individual.
Section 40(2)(a)(b) by virtue of Section 40(3)(a)(i) – Personal Information.
The full text of exemptions can be found at www.legislation.gov.uk and further guidance on how they operate can be located on the Information Commissioners Office website www.ico.org.uk
Section 30 is a class based qualified exemption which means there is no requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in releasing the requested information, however, the public interest must be considered to ensure that withholding the information is the appropriate response.
Section 38 is a prejudiced based exemption which means that it is necessary to show the harm that may be caused by release and consideration must be given as to whether there is a public interest in disclosure.
Section 40(2) of the FOIA is an absolute exemption which means there is no requirement on PSNI to consider whether there is a public interest in disclosure, PSNI must however consider if information can be released into the public domain. Section 40 is an interface exemption which means we must consider whether release of the information would breach the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) or the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). To ensure that persons cannot be identified, it has been decided to withhold the information which is the ‘personal data’ of those individuals as defined under Data Protection legislation.
Under the Freedom of Information Act, PSNI must consider if information can be released into the public domain. I have therefore considered whether the disclosure of this personal data is subject to the exemption at Section 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 by virtue of S40 (3)(A)(a). As this information is ‘personal data’, PSNI considered whether disclosure would contravene any of the six data protection principles contained within the GDPR.
The six data protection principles are good information handling standards which PSNI must comply with in relation to how it handles personal information, including deciding whether to disclose it or not. In particular, the first principle requires personal data to be processed in a ‘lawful and fair’ manner. In considering whether it is ‘fair’ to any individual to release information about them, PSNI considered the likely expectations of those individuals and the nature of the information involved. Individuals must have confidence that their information is treated sensitively and appropriately by PSNI. We consider those individuals would not have any reasonable expectation that PSNI would disclose such information of this nature about them into the public domain. We further consider it would be extremely unfair to those individuals and therefore a breach of the first principle of data protection legislation. This information is therefore exempt under section 40 (2) of the FOIA as it contravenes data protection legislation to release it, and PSNI has made the decision to withhold that information.
Harm - Section 38 CHIS (regardless of their motivation) provide information at particular personal risk to themselves and their families. As previous cases have shown, where a CHIS is identified it can result in substantial physical harm, or mental trauma resulting from the threat of physical harm.
The health and safety of any individual is a matter of concern to the PSNI. Release of any information that could place an informant at risk of identification will not be provided by the PSNI.
Public Interest Test – Section 38 Section 38 - Factors Favouring Release
Release of the information would promote openness and transparency of records held by the PSNI.
Section 38 - Factors Favouring Retention
The release of any information could lead to identification of any individual and consequently endanger the safety of an individual.
Public Interest Test - Section 30 Section 30 - Factors Favouring Release
There is information within the public domain confirming that police use CHIS to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. Disclosure of the information requested would enhance the public’s knowledge about how information relating to informants is used by PSNI and how the intelligence received assists in day to day investigations and operations to assist the prevention and detection of crime; the apprehension and prosecution of offenders and the administration of justice. Disclosure would also assist in stopping any incorrect rumours or falsehoods relating to how the police store and manage how informants assist the police.
Section 30 - Factors Against ReleaseDisclosure of the information requested could identify informant activity within Northern Ireland. Over a period of time if several disclosures were made, individuals could analyse the information and identify any sudden peaks or troughs in informant activity. This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and also prejudice our ability to maintain confidential sources. Consequently, the force’s future law enforcement capabilities would be affected.
DecisionThere is information within the public domain confirming that police use CHIS to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. The Police Service is tasked with protecting the community we serve and solving crime and there is a public interest argument in ensuring we are open and transparent with regard to policing investigations and operations. There is no doubt that for the issues outlined above any disclosure relating to sensitive informant information would jeopardise those important roles.
As has been mentioned informants play a vital role in assisting the police, and is based very much on relationships built on trust and the expectation of complete confidentiality.
The PSNI considers the balance of the public interest favours retention of this information. The PSNI will not release any information if to do so could endanger the safety of an individual.
The release of information under the FOIA is a release into the public domain and not just to the individual making the request. Once information is disclosed under FOI there is no control or limits as to who or how the information is shared with other individuals, therefore a release under FOI is considered a disclosure to the world in general.
The public interest, in this instance, is therefore best served by not releasing the information to which you seek access. It is therefore our opinion that the balance lies in favour of non-disclosure of the requested information.