March 26, 2025 | Finance and Procurement , Contracts
Request Number: FOI/13945
Category: Other
Subject: Palantir
Request and Answer:
In relation to request under Police Service of Northern Ireland is providing a Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) response and will explain this further in the response below.
Request
I'm seeking copies of any and all of the following documents in relation to your organisation's use of services provided by Palantir Technologies UK Ltd.
1. A list of current and past contracts, with start and end dates (where applicable)
2. Any and all Data Processing Arrangements
3. Any and all Data Sharing Agreements
4. Any and all Data Protection Impact Assessments
I note that many UK police forces have previously declined to confirm or deny the existence of information relating to Palantir. However, police forces including Bedfordshire and Leicestershire have since publicly confirmed using the company's services, setting a precedent for disclosure.
Additionally, Palantir is a well-known provider of products that rely on artificial intelligence. The NPCC"s Covenant for Using Artificial Intelligence in Policing, endorsed by all UK police forces, states that "all use of AI will be subject to ‘Maximum Transparency by Default"
Answer
In accordance with the Act, this letter represents a Refusal Notice for this particular request. The Police Service of Northern Ireland can neither confirm nor deny that it holds the information you have requested.
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in the request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.
Where exemptions are relied upon Section 17(1) of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which
a) states that fact,
b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and
c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.
The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) can Neither Confirm Nor Deny that it holds the information relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) National Security – The duty to confirm or deny does not arises if, or to extent that, exemption from s 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement - The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section 1(1)(a) would or would be likely to, prejudice any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1).
The full text of exemptions can be found at www.legislation.gov.uk and further guidance on how they operate can be located on the Information Commissioners Office website www.ico.org.uk.
‘Neither Confirm nor Deny’ (NCND)
There may be occasions when complying with the duty to confirm or deny under section 1(1) (a) would in itself disclose sensitive or potentially damaging information that falls under an exemption. In these circumstances, the Act allows a public authority to respond by refusing to confirm or deny whether it holds the requested information.
The decision to issue a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ response is not affected by whether we do or do not hold the information but relates to the consequences of confirming or denying the information is held. The starting point and main focus in most cases will be theoretical considerations about the consequences of confirming or denying that a particular type of information is held. The decision to neither confirm nor deny is separate from a decision not to disclose information and needs to be taken entirely on its own merits.
PSNI follow the Information Commissioner’s Guidance in relation to ‘NCND’ and you may find it helpful to refer to this at the following link:
Section 31 is a qualified prejudice based exemption and evidence of harm and a public interest test must be conducted.
Section 24 is a qualified prejudice based exemption and evidence of harm and a public interest test must be conducted.
Harm in Confirming or Denying that Information is Held Section 24 and 31
The release of information under Freedom of Information (FOI) is a release into the public domain and not just to the individual requesting the information. Once information is disclosed by FOI there is no control or limits as to who or how the information is shared with other individuals, therefore a release under FOI is considered a disclosure to the world in general.
Every effort should be made to release information under FOI. However, to confirm or deny what information may be held in relation to your request may affect the ability of Police to investigate such groups and risk undermining National Security as well as revealing if there was any involvement of exempt bodies. Confirming or denying that the information you requested does or does not exist also presents a real risk of identifying the strengths or limitations of intelligence gathering available to the PSNI.
In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the police have the ability to work together, where necessary covertly, in order to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of those who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism.
It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. It should be recognised that the security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable.
The threat to Northern Ireland from Northern Ireland related terrorism is substantial. The threat level in the UK as a whole is also substantial.
The Police Service is committed to demonstrating openness and accountability, however, if the Police Service were to either confirm or deny that information exists relevant to your request this could provide important information to those intent on criminal activity. Confirmation or denial could seriously compromise and significantly weaken police tactics resulting in an increased risk to members of the public. Additionally, confirmation or denial could undermine national security, any on-going investigations and any future investigations, as it would enable individuals/groups to take steps to avoid their actions being detected.
The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built and the police have a clear responsibility to prevent crime and arrest those responsible for committing crime or those that plan to commit crime. To disclose any information identifying the focus of policing activity or intelligence could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.
Public Interest
Factors favouring confirmation or denial for Section 24
Confirmation or denial that any other information exists relevant to the request would lead to a better informed public and provide more information on the intelligence held by the police service.
Factors against confirmation or denial for Section 24
To confirm or deny whether PSNI would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place in relation to particular organised crime groups. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security.
By confirming or denying that any information is held could render national security measures less effective. This could lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial for Section 31
Confirming or denying whether the requested information is held would enable the public to have a better understanding of the type of policing tools and tactics employed by the PSNI in carrying out their law enforcement role. This would give more confidence to the public that we are using (or, as the case may be, not using) policing tools and tactics to help us detect and prevent crime appropriately.
Factors Against Confirmation or Denial for Section 31
To confirm or deny whether any other information relating to the use of a particular investigative tool is held would harm the integrity of sensitive policing tactics used to prevent and detect crime and safeguard national security.
Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying if a particular policing tool of this type (in this case Palantir Technologies) is used by the PSNI as part of an investigative process is different from confirming if, in principle, commercial tools generally are used to assist with searches against information that may be found online.
It is well established that police forces use publically available data in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means. However, given the sensitive areas in which tools of this type may be used, to disclose if any particular tools are used would allow criminals to focus on evaluating the particular capabilities of a particular tool. With this knowledge it would allow criminals to take steps to counteract a specific tool – be it adjusting how they interact and present themselves to take advantage of any weaknesses or gaps in capability they identify. At a simple level, if a policing tool doesn’t search ‘X ‘social media site or was unable to identify ‘Y’ format of images and criminals can establish this, they will exploit this position. Additionally, criminals may be able to go further and take more proactive measures to undermine the tool and/or its provider, and a specific confirmation allows efforts to be focused accordingly.
This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal organisations now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tools are or are not deployed. This can be useful information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.
Balancing Test/Decision
When balancing the public interest it is necessary to consider the release of the requested information into the public domain. The public interest is not what interests the public, but what would be of tangible benefit to the public as a whole.
The points above highlight the merits of confirming or denying that information pertinent to this request exists. Accordingly, in a position taken in common with other law enforcement agencies, confirming or denying if the PSNI uses Palantir Technologies would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. The effective delivery of operational law enforcement takes priority and is at the forefront of PSNI to ensure the prevention and detection of crime is carried out and the effective apprehension or prosecution of offenders is maintained, whilst safeguarding victims of crime.
If it exists, disclosure would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public. Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test favours neither confirming nor denying that information is held.
Confirmation or denial of whether the PSNI hold any information would amount to a release of information either on this occasion or on other occasions where a similar request is made.
PSNI considers the information you have requested is exempt by virtue of Neither Confirm nor Deny exemptions which PSNI is entitled to rely upon.
However, this should not be taken as conclusive evidence that the information you requested exists or does not exist.